This paper uses a lab experiment to investigate developed countries' consumer valuations of the environment and workers' social rights in developing countries. It focuses on seafood products and distinguishes between regular, organic and fair trade varieties. Results show that environmental and social labels have similar effects on participant willingness-to-pay when they are first presented. Furthermore, the accumulation of labels does not influence the willingness-topay. Using welfare variation coming from the labels, we also show that the absence of negative information linked to the regular variety may lead to an underestimation of the value of information associated with the label.
Introduction
Environmentally-friendly and fair trade labeled products have emerged over the last two decades and their markets have expanded very rapidly.
1 By enhancing production and export capacities, such products may contribute to the emergence of developing countries on the world market and to their economic growth. Some factors may however restrict their sales. At the macro-level, multilateral trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO), while acknowledging the important role played by such labels, do not make them mandatory.
For instance, under WTO rules, countries cannot ban products based on the way they are produced (environment pollution, indecent working conditions, etc.). At the micro-level, consumers may not really trust such labels or are not willing to pay a premium for such products.
In this paper, we investigate developed countries' consumer valuations of the environment and workers' social rights in developing countries. Developed countries are indeed the main market for labeled products coming from developing countries. We use a lab experiment conducted in France in 2009 to evaluate the impact of information about environmental and social characteristics of products on consumer choice. We distinguish between regular and labeled varieties. Production of regular varieties may imply pollutions and/or may not respect decent social rights, while labeled varieties goods are made according to certain environmental and social production standards. Successive positive or negative information is delivered to participants. Our experiment focuses on shrimps. Several environmental and social issues affect their production in developing countries.
1 According to Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (2009), the retail value of fair trade products reached almost €2.9 billion in 2008 (+22% compared to 2007). Sales of organic food and drink reached €33.7 billion in 2007. About one-third of the world's organically managed land (almost 11 million hectares) is located in developing countries (Willer and Klicher, 2009 ).
World shrimp production has grown rapidly during the last two decades. 2 However, this boom has come at some cost. First, there are health costs as shrimps often contain bacteria (e.g. salmonella) or pesticide, drug and antibiotic residues. There are also concerns related to the environment with the destruction of mangroves and the depletion of rivers and groundwater sources for maintaining oxygen levels in farms (Greenpeace Canada, 2010) .
Other concerns deal with the illegal use of areas for shrimp aquaculture and corruption of local authorities, as well as bad working conditions. These costs are likely to play an increasing role in swaying both consumers' choices and international trade. Quality and organic labels have recently emerged for shrimps. However, they represent less than 1% of world production (Hervieu, 2009) .
Results of the experiment show that information about environmental and social characteristics needs to be relatively precise in order to produce a significant impact on consumer willingness to pay (WTP). Second, environmental and social information has similar effects on consumer willingness-to-pay. Third, consumers are receptive to the first detailed characteristic stated in the experiment but do not react to the added characteristic presented in the second position. Consumers therefore seem to be insensitive to the accumulation of information or not ready to pay an additional premium for each product attribute, except when a negative message about food safety is presented at the end of the experiment. Lastly, based on the welfare variation, we show that the absence of negative information linked to the regular variety may lead to an underestimation of the value of information associated with the label. The cost of ignorance for consumers continuing to consume the regular variety when the labeled variety is introduced into the market should be taken into account for evaluating consumer surplus.
This paper makes an important contribution to the experimental literature on labels.
This literature shows that a significant proportion of consumers are willing to pay substantial premiums for environmentally friendly products (Blend and Van Ravenswaay, 1999; Nimon and Beghin, 1999; Wessells et al., 1999; Loureiro et al., 2001; Bougherara and Combris, 2009) or fair trade products (Arnot et al., 2006) . However, there is still disagreement on whether or not labeling should combine different characteristics to increase WTP and to favor products from developing countries. Loureiro and Lotade (2005) compare WTP for coffee with fair trade or organic labels and Bernard and Bernard (2009) compare WTP for milk with conventional, organic, rBST-free or no-antibiotic characteristics. These papers offer a ranking of positive premiums for these new characteristics signaled by a label and suggest that consumers are very receptive to one characteristic. Our paper differs since we show that the ordering of information is crucial. Participants are receptive to the first-detailed characteristic presented in the experiment. However, we also highlight a fast-diminishing interest in the added characteristic presented in second position. This result suggests (i) the importance of the first/major information sent by advertising campaigns to consumers to signal new varieties, (ii) the difficulties of developing added attributes for new varieties when one attribute dominates a market and (iii) the possibilities of cumulating several labels to attract consumers with different priorities regarding the conditions of production and not consumers with utilities favoring added attributes.
The second contribution of our paper is to provide a complete estimation of the value of information associated with labels and defined by consumer surplus variations derived from the experimental results. This estimation includes all negative and positive information for a characteristic (social or environmental) that delineates the regular and the new labeled varieties. In the existing studies (Huffman et al., 2003 and Rousu et al., 2004 and Lusk et al., 2005; Rousu and Lusk, 2009 or Lusk and Marette, Forthcoming) , all the information revealed in the experiment concerns only the newly introduced variety and not the regular/conventional variety. Our paper shows that the omission of the negative (or positive) information linked to the regular/conventional variety may bias the estimation of the information value. More precisely, this omission leads to an underestimation of the value of information associated with the label since the knowledge about the regular variety is still imperfect.
The next section describes the experiment. Results are reported in section 3. Section 4 provides econometric estimations of the determinants of consumer willingness-to-pay.
Section 5 studies the value of information and consumer welfare. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of labels for the emergence of developing countries on the world market.
Experiment
This section details the sample, the product, the experimental procedure and the revealed information.
Sample
The sample consists of 160 people aged between 18 and 85 years. We conducted the experiment in Paris, France, in multiple one-hour sessions in December 2009. The sample of participants was randomly selected based on the quota method. Participants were contacted by phone. They were informed that the experiment would focus on food behavior and shrimp consumption and would last about one hour with a 15-euro participation fee. The sample is relatively representative of the age-groups and the socio-economic status of the population of the city although retired people are slightly over-represented.
In our experiment, the sample is divided into four groups (see the explanation and the The experiment elicits hypothetical responses, since we do not offer the real product at the end of the experiment, and this for three reasons. First, as no fair trade shrimps are sold in France, it is not possible to give a real "fair trade" variety of the product to participants at the end of each lab session if their choices lead them to favor this variety during the experiment. Second, there is no brand offering both conventional and organic varieties, making the auctions and the isolation of the premium linked to the organic characteristic very complex. Third, the cold process linked to refrigeration makes the sale/distribution of real products to participants hazardous in terms of food safety. However, despite possible hypothetical biases in the WTP elicitations, the protocol precisely controls the revelation of information in the lab.
Experimental design and revealed information
The experiment is divided into several stages as described in figure 1. Participants receive general instructions and sign a consent form. They fill in an entry questionnaire on consumption behavior and socio-demographic characteristics. Five successive types of information are then communicated. After each round of information revelation, participants fill in a multi-price list (or payment card) presented on a paper sheet, which allows elicitation of the WTP. Participants fill in an exit questionnaire and receive the €15 indemnity.
Insert figure 1 here
While the complete information revealed to participants is given in appendix 1, it is possible to sum up the content delivered at different points in the experiment as follows: -First, we provide general information about the shrimps preceding the participants' choice #1 to elicit WTP. A price range of existing prices observed in supermarkets (between €1.50 and €4 for 100g of farmed, midsize, shelled, cooked and refrigerated shrimps enclosed in a plastic package) is mentioned.
Second, we provide brief information on concerns about the environment and working conditions preceding the participants' choice #2.
Third, before choices #3, #4 and #5 we provide successive additional information about possible environmental and working conditions and safety attributes linked to shrimps. The environmental and social information precedes the information about safety, which is always revealed at the end of the experiment (before choice #5). Previous experiments reveal that safety information is a priority for participants eclipsing other characteristics (see Marette et al., 2009) , while in this experiment we want to ignore food safety considerations except at the end of the experiment.
We conduct the experiment in four treatments, varying the type (positive vs. negative) and the order of information about green and ethical characteristics (respectively before choices #3 and #4). participants are asked to choose whether or not they will buy the product for prices varying from €0.25 to €4 with a 25-cent interval between possible choices. A colored picture of the shrimp package is posted on the paper sheet. For fair trade and organic shrimps, we also post a "fair trade" or "organic" label. For each price, participants have to check off either "yes", "no" or "maybe" regarding their purchase intentions. The option "maybe" is useful for capturing hesitation that differs from a firm "yes". For each choice #i with i=1,...,5, the WTP is determined by taking the highest price linked to a "yes" choice (with the following highest price on the paper sheet implying a reply "no" or "maybe" capturing hesitation). If during a choice #i, no "yes" is checked off, we set the WTP to zero (recall that the first choice was for a price equal to €0.25). If during a choice #i, "yes" is always selected, we arbitrarily set the WTP to €4. Andersen et al. (2006) underline two disadvantages of the multiple price list. The first disadvantage is the interval response eliciting interval from participants rather than point estimates for WTP. With our experiment, the 25-cent interval guarantees enough precision for the elicited WTP. The other disadvantage is the framing effect with a psychological bias towards the middle of the multiple price list for choices made by participants. Andersen et al. (2006) control for this effect by changing the boundaries of the multiple price list. In this paper we do not control for this framing effect, since we focus on the impact of the revelation of information and messages. The psychological bias is plausible for the first round of our experiment, 18.1% of participants expressing a WTP of €2. However, this effect disappears after the revelation of information. Only 11.3% of participants make a bid of €2 in choice #2, and this percentage becomes less than 6% in choices #3, #4 and #5.
Despite these limitations, the multiple price list methodology is useful for providing information regarding the consumers' WTP. The main advantage is the simplicity of the explanation given to participants at the beginning of the experiment, which differs from auction mechanisms where organizers need to convince participants that bid manipulation is useless under a Vickrey mechanism. We now turn to the results.
Experimental results
Figures 2 and 3 show the average WTP in euro for 100g of shrimps. This average takes into account bids by all participants, including the ones with WTP equal to zero because of no "yes" checked off. The standard deviation is reported in parentheses. Recall that groups IA and IB presented in figure 2 (respectively groups IIA and IIB presented in figure 3 ) receive positive information with labels (respectively negative information). The x-axis of each figure details under each bar the round of choice i with i=1,...,5 and the information preceding the choice leading to the WTP elicitation. The indicators ∆ isolate the significant impact of a single round of additional information. We test for the significance of the WTP differences following a single round of information (namely, between WTP #i and WTP #i+1) by using the Wilcoxon test for paired samples and indicate the significant differences at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% level.
Insert figures 2 and 3 here
Seven main results could be highlighted: showing that short and simple information is efficient for changing WTP (see Wansink et al., 2004) . Clearly, there are no definitive conclusions that depend on both the products and the characteristics at stake.
(iii) A sufficient level of precision in the revealed information is efficient for changing
WTP. Participants react to the second and more precise round of information (before choice #3). The differences in WTP between the second and third bars of each graph are significant, except for group IIB (significant at 10.1% only).
(iv) Positive information has a larger impact in absolute value than negative
information. The average variation in absolute value between the second and third bars is equal to €0.73 for group IA, €0.75 for group IB and only to €0.48 for group IIA, €0.34 for group IIB. This diverges from some results on food safety showing that negative information has a larger impact than positive information (see Hayes et al., 1995; Fox et al., 2002) . an information perturbation whatever its content (information effect per se). As a consequence, the significant impact of information before choice #3 can really be interpreted as a shock coming from the content of positive information (groups IA and IB) or negative information (groups IIA and IIB). Second, the significant impact of the last round of information before choice #5 indicates that participants' attention does not suffer from a tiredness effect. The non-significant impact of information before choice #4 can therefore be interpreted as the absence of an additional premium for a second characteristic (under both positive and negative information).
Before turning to the econometric estimations, we provide some details on participants' perceptions of the environment, social rights in developing countries and food safety. Questions on these issues were asked to participants in the entry and exit questionnaires. Participants rated their perceptions on an increasing scale ranging from 1 to 10. Instead of socio-economic characteristics, column (3) controls for participants' perceptions of the environment and workers rights in developing countries. We focus on the importance attached by participants to these issues. As shown in table 3, participants value such issues highly. Ratings expressed by participants on an increasing scale ranging from 0 to 10 are converted into dummies. These dummies are set to 1 for ratings above 5 and to 0 otherwise. Results suggest that the importance attached by participants to the protection of workers' rights in developing countries does not influence WTP. Quite surprisingly, the importance attached to the protection of the environment has a negative and significant (p<0.05) impact on WTP. As in column (2), estimated coefficients on the information variables are very stable.
Column (4) includes both socio-economic and perception controls. The magnitude and level of significance of parameters remain unchanged. The R² is equal to 0.198, which is similar to what is usually found in the literature.
In column (5), the sample is restricted to the first four choices. The last choice, after the revelation of the negative information on food safety, is excluded from the estimation.
The coefficient on the 'negative information' variable is reduced compared to the previous estimations. This result is not really surprising since safety risks tend to negatively influence participants' WTP (see figures 2 and 3). Interestingly, the coefficients on information dummies (in absolute terms) are now almost similar (0.75 vs. 0.73). Estimated coefficients on education variables become insignificant. However, except for this change, all other previous conclusions on socio-economic and perception controls still hold.
In column (6), we interact the dummies on positive and negative information with dummies on the type of revealed information: environmental, social or health-related.
According to table 2, the dummy for 'social information' is set to one for choice #3 for groups IA and IIA and choice #4 for groups IB and IIB (0 otherwise). The dummy for 'environmental information' is set to one choice #3 for groups IB and IIB and for choice #4
for groups IA and IIA (0 otherwise). Lastly, the dummy for 'safety information' is set to one for choice #5 for all groups (0 otherwise). The interaction terms are all significant at the 1% level and have the expected sign: positive social and environmental information increases WTP, while negative environmental, social and safety information reduces WTP.
Interestingly, the F-tests show that the interaction terms (positive x social and positive x environmental information on one hand and negative x social, negative x environmental, and negative x safety information on the other hand) are not significantly different. Socioeconomic and perception controls are not influenced by the inclusion of the interaction terms.
Finally, column (7) presents the results of the Tobit estimation. In our sample, WTP range from 0 to 4 and are therefore left-and right-censored. Our sample includes 232 leftaffect the results.
censored observations (WTP=0), 74 right-censored observations (WTP=4), and 494 uncensored observations (0<WTP<4). Tobit estimated coefficients are slightly higher than those reported column (6). However, previous conclusions remain unchanged. Furthermore, the F-tests again suggest the absence of significant differences between the interactions terms. We now turn to the surplus estimation based on the WTP elicited in the experiment.
Insert table 4 here

Value of information and consumer welfare
The WTP can be used to determine the consumer surplus and the value of information.
Following Foster and Just (1989) and Teisl et al. (2001) , information is welfare enhancing if consumers change their consumption behavior. The contribution of our experiment is twofold. First, we investigate whether positive and negative information for the same characteristics has a similar impact on participants' behaviors. Second, we combine both positive and negative information to estimate consumer welfare. Our approach therefore differs from the previous studies focusing only on the effect or/and the value of information related to the labeled variety (Huffman et al., 2003 and Rousu et al., 2004 and Lusk et al., 2005; Rousu and Lusk, 2009 (ii) When negative information about the regular/conventional variety is revealed to groups IIA and IIB, consumers may take different action compared to the absence of precise information. In this case, we may determine a cost of ignorance. The negative information may characterize media coverage or a campaign by a non-governmental organization.
(iii) Eventually, we combine both types of positive and negative information in a way described below, to have a complete view when different varieties of a given product coexist on the market. This approach is overlooked in previous studies where all the positive or negative information revealed in the experiment only concerned the GM variety and not the regular (or conventional) variety.
Positive information about the new (labeled) variety
With the positive information linked to a labeled variety for groups IA and IB, we can measure the impact of a label introduction on participants' surplus. Before measuring the value of information, we determine the participants' purchase choices in periods 1 and 3. We assume that a participant purchases a good if their WTP for the good is higher than the price observed on average in the supermarkets in France. Before choice #1, only "regular" shrimps are offered, and the participant can choose between two outcomes: regular at price R P and none. The participant j chooses the option generating the highest utility, namely:
where the subscript 1 denotes the bid linked to choice #1 for a participant j (with j=1,…,N).
When a label is introduced at price L P (before choice #3), the participant can choose between three outcomes: regular variety, labeled variety, and none. She/he chooses the alternative, which generates the highest utility, and thus:
We now turn to the value of information by using two metrics to compute the average value for each group IA or IB receiving positive information. The participant surplus change from a label introduction, if all participants are fully informed about the label, is:
. (3) where K can take two values. First K=S P , where S P is the number of switchers receiving positive information who start to consume the labeled variety after its introduction. In this case, the information revelation only modifies the surplus of these switchers. Conversely, the surplus variation is zero for participants who do not change their behavior, namely by continuing to choose the regular variety or nothing when the label is introduced and when R P is constant (which is the case under constant-return to scale for producers). Second, K=N P , where N P is the overall number of participants within a group receiving positive information.
The measure given by (3) is similar to the one provided in papers focusing on the introduction of GMOs (see the introduction for the references).
Negative information about the regular variety
With the negative information revealed to groups IIA and IIB, we can measure the cost of ignorance linked to the lack of precise information (as before choice #1 
where K=S N (the number of switchers) or K=N N (the overall number of participants within a group receiving negative information). In this context, S N is the number of switchers that stop consuming the product when the negative information is revealed before choice #3.
Combination of the positive and negative information
Eventually, one can combine the negative and positive information across the groups. The (1) and linked to the choice #1, the overall surplus with only regular varieties on the market is:
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The introduction of the label leads to two situations, namely case 1 and case 2. Under case 1, participants faced with a label are only aware of the positive information coming from the label for choosing between options (regular, label, and none) , but their choices may be distorted because of a lack of information regarding the regular variety. Their surplus is
, where II j R is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if participant j is predicted to have chosen the regular variety at price P R when the label exists on the market. In this case, the value of information is:
where K=S P (the number of switchers) or K=N P (the overall number of participants within a group receiving positive information). ( )
where K=S P (the number of switchers) or K=N P (the overall number of participants within a group).
All these measures indicating the value of information (or the welfare variation linked to more complete information) lead to the following results presented in table 5. Based on observations across several supermarkets, we use P R = €2.2 and a price premium equal to 25% for the varieties with a label leading to P L = €2.75 (see Hervieu, 2009 ).
7
The first three lines of table 5 measure the value of information as in previous papers by focusing on the information related to the new variety. Lines 4-6 measure the value of negative information linked to the regular variety. The value of the negative information is higher than the value of the positive information, because of a higher number of switchers stopping consumption of the regular variety when negative information is revealed. This result shows the importance of taking into account the cost of ignorance coming from the regular variety when measuring the value of information.
Results based on the combination of positive and negative information are presented in the bottom part of table 5. Both cases 1 and 2 show a relative large value of information, which is higher than that observed when only the information related to the new variety is accounted for. Thus, by focusing only on the information related to the new variety, previous welfare measures underestimate the value of information. Robust evaluations need to combine both negative and positive information. Interestingly, our results also show that the two average values of information over all participants given in the last line of table 5 are relatively high compared to a price P R = €2.2 considered for the estimations of the surplus variation coming from the information. This suggests a high-social benefit linked to the complete revelation of information to consumers. This benefit should be compared to regulatory costs coming from quality monitoring and advertising efforts.
Insert table 5 here
Moreover, fully revealing negative and positive information generates higher WTP by developed countries' consumers that can be of benefit to producers from developing countries. The results of the experiment could therefore be used to measure the increase in producers' marginal income from a complete development of labels, where both labeled and regular varieties would be offered everywhere in France. The simulation is as follows: In France, the consumption of farmed tropical shrimps is 56,548,800 kg per year.
8 To carry out the income estimation, we consider the participants who switch to labeled varieties after the information revelation. Among them, we distinguish the percentage x of participants who purchase regular variety before the label introduction and the percentage y of participants who do not purchase shrimps before the label introduction. The income increase for producers comes from these consumers changing varieties at a better price P L compared to P R and from the new consumers purchasing goods at price P L . Ignoring any cost consideration the increase in producers' marginal income is defined by 56,548,800
and presented in table 6. Although these estimations are imperfect because of the absence of precise information, they show significant increase in producers' income that may cover additional label-sunk costs (not passed into the price P L ) and generate higher income compared to the existing situation.
Insert table 6 here
In order to keep the mathematical aspects as simple as possible, the estimation of the welfare variations based on equations (1) to (9) was admittedly simple. In order to fit different problems from various contexts, some extensions could be integrated into the model presented here. First, the prices of varieties P R and P L were assumed constant for the sake of simplicity, while an extension with an increasing supply function under decreasing returns to scale would lead to a price increase of organic and fair trade varieties and a price decrease of regular varieties when complete information is revealed. 9 Second, if the positive information can be provided by a label voluntarily chosen by producers, the negative information related to the regular variety is more difficult to reveal. However, a per-unit Pigouvian tax equal to ( ) E COI imposed on the regular variety could favor clean or fair varieties and generate better income for producers from developing countries searching for added-value products.
Conclusion
These results suggest that environmental and social information has similar effects on participant willingness-to-pay when it is first presented. Furthermore, the accumulation of labels seems useless, which means that farmers from developing countries should carefully consider the type of labels they should use to improve quality and capture consumer WTP.
Developing organic varieties could be a "bonanza" for shrimp producers as the organic logo is already known by consumers in developed countries.
Using welfare variation from the organic or fair trade labels, we also show that the absence of negative information linked to the regular variety may lead to an underestimation of the value of information associated with the label. The consumers' choices are distorted since the negative information linked to the regular variety is not internalized by consumers.
The segment for products with labels could be expanded. This last result underlines that the benefit of complete information could be high not only for French consumers but also for shrimp producers developing high-quality products.
Improving the quality of agricultural products is one way to increase income in developing countries, even if choosing the type of labels or the advertising strategy is challenging for these producers. An experiment in some shrimp farms in Asian countries to find out producer willingness to invest in high-quality/labeled products may suitably complete the analysis. 
In the French system, the high school diploma is called 'baccalaureate' (BAC). ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. Robust estimations. Standard errors in parentheses. F-test for parameters equality: column (2): F-test on education variables = 0.551; Column (6): F-test on positive info. x social info. and positive info. x environmental info. = 0.256; F-test on negative info x social info, negative info. x environmental info. and negative info. x safety info. = 0.591; Column (7): F-test on positive info. x social info. and positive info. x environmental info. = 0.364; F-test on negative info x social info, negative info. x environmental info. and negative info. x safety info. = 0.445. 
